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Centralised Labour Market Negotiations: Strategic Behaviour Curbs Employment

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This paper contributes to the analysis of centralised versus decentralised labour market negotiations. Applying the familiar Nash bargaining solution, we show that centralised negotiations lead to a lower employment level but to a higher wage rate than decentralised labour market bargaining. While this is an important theoretical result on its own, it has important effects for both empirical labour market research and labour market policies. Also, this result counters the critique that efficient negotiations result in employment levels exceeding the competitive level.
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Keywords: CENTRALISED AND DECENTRALISED LABOUR MARKET NEGOTIATIONS; EFFICIENT BARGAINS; ENDOGENOUS OUTPUT PRICE; NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION; WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 01 June 2018

This article was made available online on 12 May 2017 as a Fast Track article with title: "Centralised Labour Market Negotiations: Strategic Behaviour Curbs Employment".

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  • Founded as Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

    As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.

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    From 2013 on all accepted articles are published in an Online First version (in their final layout) to make them searchable and citable by their DOI immediately after peer review and acceptance. Once the article is published in an issue of the journal, the Online First version will be removed.

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