Skip to main content

Airport-airline Relationship, Competition and Welfare in a Multi-airport System: The Case of New Beijing Daxing Airport

Buy Article:

$38.58 + tax (Refund Policy)

A game-theoretical model is developed in the context of the regulated multi-airport system (MAS), examining the regulator's policy in airport slot allocation and airlines' airport entry decisions. The regulator has a mixing objective to put different weights on passenger surplus and airports/airlines' profits. It can choose to intervene in airline allocation (that is, one-airport-one-airline rule) or not. It is found when the regulator does not intervene in airline allocation, airlines choose to enter both airports bringing about higher welfare. However, the regulator would intervene if it puts a sufficiently high weight on airports/airlines' profits.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China 2: Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Publication date: April 1, 2022

More about this publication?
  • JTEP is international both in terms of authors and readership. Since it first appeared, more than 1,000 papers have been published from Europe, North America, the Pacific Rim/Australasia, Africa, Asia, and South America. This international variety is also reflected in the readership.

    Published four times a year, the journal covers all modes of transport and a wide variety of economic themes, including: Passenger Transport, Freight Transport, Shipping, Aviation, Transport Infrastructure, Environment & Energy, Traffic, Planning and Policy, Safety, Costs & Pricing, Competition, Evaluation, Productivity, Demand & Elasticities, Service Quality, Economies of Scale, Economics Regulation and Choice.

    A complete indexing and article service is available FREE from 1967 to 2000

  • Editorial Board
  • Submit a Paper
  • Subscribe to this Title
  • Library Recommendation Form
  • About us
  • Ingenta Connect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites
  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content