On Chalmers on the Meta-Problem

In this commentary on Chalmers' work on the meta-problem of consciousness, I defend an approach to the meta-problem that Chalmers finds unpromising (i.e. what Chalmers has called the 'usemention fallacy' strategy.) The core of this strategy is the idea that thinking about consciousness requires a special mode of thought that activates phenomenal consciousness itself, which then facilitates a (mistaken) intuition that a first-person thought of consciousness and a third-person thought of a brain state cannot refer to the same thing. Chalmers considers this strategy as offering a diagnosis in terms of the 'use-mention fallacy' and dismisses it quickly. However, close examination shows that the strategy is not about a use-mention confusion. Also, a revision to this strategy can provide an account that withstands counter-examples and connects with many ideas that may lead to a solution to the meta-problem.