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Undermining Belief in Consciousness

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Does consciousness exist? In 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness' Chalmers (2018) sketches an argument for illusionism, i.e. the view that it does not. The key premise is that it would be a coincidence if our beliefs about consciousness were true, given that the explanation of those beliefs is independent of their truth. In this article, I clarify and assess this argument. I argue that our beliefs about consciousness are peculiarly invulnerable to undermining, whether or not their contents are indubitable or even obvious. But the reason that they are peculiarly invulnerable to undermining points to a flaw in modal arguments for dualism.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2019

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