Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure

Consciousness in Classical Sociological Theories

Buy Article:

$22.68 + tax (Refund Policy)

The concept of 'consciousness' appears in the works of all major classical sociological figures. Curiously, to date, no systematic effort exists toward a comparative assessment of its use. We are accordingly unable to appreciate the importance of that concept for the foundations of sociological thought, or to understand fully how each theorist is positioned within that tradition. This article turns to five foundational theorists-- Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Mead, and Du Bois -- and puts forth four propositions. First, the entire theoretical edifice of each thinker is built on the assumption that human beings are conscious beings. Without it, their theoretical constructs could not exist. Sociology as a discipline is thus predicated on the belief in human consciousness. Yet, second, what humans are conscious 'of' varies significantly across theorists, as does the prominence of that consciousness in actors' minds. Third, all theorists recognize the existence of some sort of 'shared' consciousnesses besides individual ones. At the same time, fourth, they hold different assessments of whether the intersections between individual and shared consciousnesses are places of harmony or conflict. The final section summarizes the key comparative findings and reflects on the broader takeaways for sociology and the study of consciousness itself.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2018

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more