Conceptual Short-Term Memory: A Missing Part of the Mind?
In debates in philosophy and cognitive science concerning short-term memory mechanisms and perceptual experience, most discussion has focused on the working memory and the various forms of sensory memory such as iconic memory. In this paper, I present a summary of some evidence for a proposed further form of memory termed conceptual short-term memory. I go on to outline some of the ways in which this additional distinctive sort of short-term memory might be of relevance to ongoing philosophical debates, specifically in relation to questions about high-level perceptual phenomenology, the relationship between consciousness and reportability, and the boundary between cognition and perception. I conclude that conceptual short-term memory offers a promising new direction of research and philosophical investigation.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, 16 Mill Lane, Email: [email protected]
Publication date: January 1, 2017