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What Makes Up a Mood Experience?

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In this paper I argue that the phenomenal character of a mood experience wholly depends on affective modifications (appropriate for the mood in question) to the phenomenal characters of one's non-mood experiences. I argue that this view accounts for all distinctive aspects of mood phenomenology, in contrast to currently existing accounts of moods, each of which faces trouble accounting for some distinctive aspect of mood experience. I also explain how my view allows for holding both that moods seemingly lack intentional objects and that their phenomenal character reduces to intentional content nonetheless.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 01 January 2017

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