The Illusion of Illusionism
A central thesis of Frankish's argument for illusionism is the claim that illusionism is possibly true. This is what the realist about phenomenal consciousness must deny. Frankish's argument for that premise is based on a widely shared understanding of phenomenal consciousness
as being a matter of certain events (experiences) instantiating special properties (phenomenal properties). I argue that the illusionist's reasoning is difficult to avoid if one accepts this common account. A positive argument for the thesis that the mere possibility of illusionism can
be excluded is developed. It uses a proposal about how the notion of phenomenal consciousness should be taken to pick out the phenomenon it refers to. Given that account it becomes obvious that the illusionist cannot be understood as seriously accepting his own theory. The (supposed) belief
in illusionism thus turns out to be an illusion.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: University of Fribourg, Switzerland., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 01 January 2016
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