Dual-Aspect Monism a la Pauli and Jung
Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology, Freiburg; and Collegium Helveticum, Zürich, Email: [email protected]
Publication date: January 1, 2012