Goodbye To Qualia And All What? A Reply to David Hodgson
David Hodgson's review article, 'Goodbye To Qualia And All That?' in the February issue of this journal (Hodgson, 2005) alleges that 'some of the basic propositions' of the book Max Bennett and I wrote together, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003), are fundamentally mistaken. He cites three issues: direct realism regarding perception; our insistence that it is wrong to suppose that a person has 'access', let alone 'privileged access', to his own experiences; and our contention that the subject of experience is not 'a self', but a human being. The reasoning behind his allegations is flawed, and the conclusion he draws from them, namely that 'qualia' are alive and well, does not follow.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: January 1, 2005