The Philosophical Nature of Maturana’s Theory of Perception
This paper deals with the philosophical nature of H. R. Maturana’s theory of perception. For such a purpose, one of his core concepts, structural determinism, was closely examined, which revealed that his theory of perception is not an ontological/metaphysical idealism as realist
philosophers regarded. My diagnosis is that his theory should be regarded as a version of epistemic idealism underpinned by what Maturana calls the substratum. Thus, he presented us a renewed view of objectivity based on our human biology of cognition, replacing the traditional view of
objectivity.
Keywords: Reality; objectivity; structural determinism; substratum; trigger
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Graduate School of Letters (Philosophy), Hokkaido University, N10W7, Kita, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan ., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 01 January 2004
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