In Defense of Moral Economy: Marx's Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Value
Marx's criticism of Aristotle's theory of value is refuted. Aristotle's theory is explained. Marx is shown is be even more indebted to Aristotle than previously thought, but his argument for a strict commensurability of goods is shown to fail. Aristotle's solution to the problem of the incommensurability of goods, i.e., his proposal of “sufficient” commensurability “with respect to need,” is discussed as a possible solution and is shown to be representable mathematically. Aristotle's theory of value has greater explanatory power than Marx's.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: January 1, 2014
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