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Von der Fiktion zur Abstraktion

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The opinion that imputation to juridical persons is impossible for reasons of their fictionality is commonly held. Analyzing the topic as it was discussed in the 17th and 18th century by Dadino Alteserra (1602-1682) and Nikolaus Hieronymus Gundling (1671-1729) the paper shows that, firstly, juridical persons are not generated by fiction but abstraction. Therefore, secondly, terms denoting moral persons of such kind are, unlike fictional ones, possible parts of true empirical judgements. As true empirical judgements are presupposed by judgements of imputation imputation to juridical persons is, indeed, possible since juridical persons are possible subjects of true empirical judgements.
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Language: ger

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 01 October 2010

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  • Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, edited by authorisation of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), is an international, peer-reviewed journal, first published in 1907. It features original articles on philosophical research on legal and social questions, covering all aspects of social and legal life.
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