Der ,,naturalistische Fehlschluß“ als juristische Argumentationsfigur
The talk of a naturalistic fallacy has become rather common in recent bioethical debates, especially in the field of jurisprudence. The following article takes a closer look at the term, retracing it to its origin in the moral philosophy of G.E. Moore. The analysis shows that the concept of the naturalistic fallacy is not only philosophically highly controversial. It is also neither used correctly – in its original meaning – in the current debates nor is it very helpful to solve the specific juridical questions in bioethics.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: October 1, 2008
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- Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, edited by authorisation of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), is an international, peer-reviewed journal, first published in 1907. It features original articles on philosophical research on legal and social questions, covering all aspects of social and legal life.
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