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Logische Probleme bei der Bestimmung der pränatalen Menschenwürde

Anmerkungen zu einem unscharfen Rechtsbegriff

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This contribution investigates the logical and philosophical premises of the prevailing “static” conception of dignity, above all in the areas of prenatal human dignity, and contrasts this conception with a “dynamic” understanding of dignity. The author favours the attempt not of regarding the immanent indistinctiveness of the term “human dignity” as a problem of the legal order which necessarily ought to be eliminated, but rather of making this indistinctiveness itself useful and fertile for a “fluctuating” or fluid (i.e. because of its gradations) concept of dignity.

The above-mentioned indistinctiveness of human dignity demands a decision which reminds one that it is interwoven in a field of conceptual indistinctiveness.
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Language: ger

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: October 1, 2008

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  • Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, edited by authorisation of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), is an international, peer-reviewed journal, first published in 1907. It features original articles on philosophical research on legal and social questions, covering all aspects of social and legal life.
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