Der Grundsatz der Menschenwürde und das Problem des ,,Zwecks an-sich“
In the current theoretical discourse, human dignity as it is enshrined in the German Basic Law, is often interpreted as a special ,,right to non-instrumentalization“ which overturns any other human right. This interpretation usually refers to Kant's concept of human dignity, according to which any person is an “end-in-itself”. By discussing the different possibilities on how to understand this idea, I want to point out that none of possible interpretations of Kant's concept can give good reasons for an understanding of human dignity as a special “right to non-instrumentalization”. Instead I propose to understand human dignity as the principle of and the reason for the absolute inviolability of basic human rights.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: October 1, 2008
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