The Limits of Justifying Punishment
Retributive theories not only explain why punishment should be administered, but often there is also a commitment to a retributive standard for the degree of punishment. In this paper, I first show that several variations are possible with regard to this standard. Next, I argue that neither of these standards can be specified. In fact, generally speaking there can be little clarity when we discuss in abstraction the degree of punishment. Hence, we should refrain from using these abstract standards and opt for another kind of investigation in order to further study questions concerning the degree of punishment. In the end of the paper, I suggest there is a better way of dealing with these persistent and disturbing questions concerning the various systems of criminal law.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Article Media
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: July 1, 2005
More about this publication?
- Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, edited by authorisation of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), is an international, peer-reviewed journal, first published in 1907. It features original articles on philosophical research on legal and social questions, covering all aspects of social and legal life.
- Editorial Board
- Information for Authors
- Submit a Paper
- Subscribe to this Title
- Terms & Conditions
- Ingenta Connect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites