Study on Dynamic Game Between Banks and Medium-Small Enterprise Based on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In this paper, we study the problems of Medium-small Enterprise financing difficult which is bottleneck that restricting development of SME based on game theory, and discuss incomplete information static game and dynamic game between the bank and enterprises in the case of the information asymmetry.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: March 1, 2012
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