A Game Analysis of Manufacturers' Product Safety Responsibility Based on the Bertrand Competition
Applying the basic idea of game thoery, this article analyses the game of manufacturers' product safety responsibility based on the Bertrand competition. The results show that: The level of the product safety responsibility provided by category g manufacturers is the same as if the category g consumers were making private voluntary contributions to the product safety responsibility. Raising the level of the product safety responsibility among category g manufacturers who supply category g consumers can create a Pareto improvement. g kind of manufacturers should transmit product safety responsibility signals effectively to solve the problem of asymmetrical information about product safety responsibility, and then establish good social reputation and increase expected profit.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Article Media
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: March 1, 2012
More about this publication?
- ADVANCED SCIENCE LETTERS is an international peer-reviewed journal with a very wide-ranging coverage, consolidates research activities in all areas of (1) Physical Sciences, (2) Biological Sciences, (3) Mathematical Sciences, (4) Engineering, (5) Computer and Information Sciences, and (6) Geosciences to publish original short communications, full research papers and timely brief (mini) reviews with authors photo and biography encompassing the basic and applied research and current developments in educational aspects of these scientific areas.
- Editorial Board
- Information for Authors
- Subscribe to this Title
- Ingenta Connect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites