Killing in Self-Defence and the Case for Biocentric Individualism
The primary method for defending biocentric individualism - a prominent theory of the moral value of organisms - is to appeal to the fact that there are certain things that are good for and bad for living creatures, even if they are not sentient. This defence is typically and frequently met with the objection that we can determine what is good for some living creature without thereby having any moral reason or obligation to promote or avoid undermining it. In this paper I show how a theory of the morality of defensive violence pre-empts this objection.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: April 1, 2018
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- Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines, which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.
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