Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure

Remarks on Independence Proofs and Indirect Reference

Buy Article:

$53.00 + tax (Refund Policy)

In the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in a re-evaluation of Frege's stance towards consistency- and independence proofs. Papers by several authors deal with Frege's views on these topics. In this note, I want to discuss one particular problem, which seems to be a main reason for Frege's reluctant attitude towards his own proposed method of proving the independence of axioms, namely his view that thoughts, that is, intensional entities are the objects of metatheoretical investigations. This stands in contrast to more straightforward interpretations, which claim that Frege's hesitancy is mainly due to worries concerning the logical constants or what counts as a logical inference.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy,University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 71010,Vienna, Austria

Publication date: February 1, 2013

More about this publication?
  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more