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Frege on Indirect Proof

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Frege's account of indirect proof has been thought to be problematic. This thought seems to rest on the supposition that some notion of logical consequence – which Frege did not have – is indispensable for a satisfactory account of indirect proof. It is not so. Frege's account is no less workable than the account predominant today. Indeed, Frege's account may be best understood as a restatement of the latter, although from a higher order point of view. I argue that this ascent is motivated by Frege's conception of logic.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Philosophy Department,Willamette University, SalemOregon97301, USA

Publication date: August 1, 2011

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