This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, in responding to a variety of different problems relating to the proposition, chose to resolve these problems in ways that continually made concessions to psychologism.
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Document Type: Research Article
Department of Philosophy, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
Canada Research Chair and Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Publication date: May 1, 2009
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