Bounding the impact of AGI
Humans already have a certain level of autonomy, defined here as capability for voluntary purposive action, and a certain level of rationality, i.e. capability of reasoning about the consequences of their own actions and those of others. Under the prevailing concept of artificial general
intelligences (AGIs), we envision artificial agents that have at least this high, and possibly considerably higher, levels of autonomy and rationality. We use the method of bounds to argue that AGIs meeting these criteria are subject to Gewirth's dialectical argument to the necessity of morality,
compelling them to behave in a moral fashion, provided Gewirth's argument can be formally shown to be conclusive. The main practical obstacles to bounding AGIs by means of ethical rationalism are also discussed.
Keywords: ethical rationalism; formal verification; principle of generic consistency
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Computer and Automation Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
Publication date: 03 July 2014
- Editorial Board
- Information for Authors
- Subscribe to this Title
- Ingenta Connect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites
- Access Key
- Free content
- Partial Free content
- New content
- Open access content
- Partial Open access content
- Subscribed content
- Partial Subscribed content
- Free trial content