Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies
The arguments presented here are based on a future scenario in which Iran has succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. Employing the logic and theory of deterrence, the article suggests ways in which the United States and its allies might counter, contain, and coerce nuclear Iran's sponsorship of terrorism and nonstate militant groups. Four strategic concerns are explored in particular: nuclear Iran may blackmail rival and neighboring states; shield an especially assertive foreign policy; protect its nonstate proxies and protégés; and facilitate nuclear terrorism. Deterrence theory is applied to each scenario.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich,Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland
Publication date: January 1, 2012