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Dissuading Nuclear Adversaries: The Strategic Concept of Dissuasion and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

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This essay contributes to an understanding of the strategic concept of dissuasion by defining it as the active constraint of rationally beneficial options available to a current or potential geopolitical rival in order to preserve the national interests or goals of the US or its allies. The key military component of dissuasion lies in its link to deterrence, wherein the promise of credible deterrence raises the costs of alternatives to a rival. Dissuasion is further refined through analyses of historical case studies, the current security environment, and future scenarios and by identifying three operational types: global, regional, and tactical

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of California Davis, California, USA

Publication date: 01 April 2005

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