Delegation and Accountability: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey
Delegation of authority to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) creates a breach in chain accountability established in parliamentary democracies and, hence, necessitates designing different mechanisms of accountability that do not undermine the independence of these agencies. After building a framework to assess the accountability of IRAs across countries and sectors, this article analyzes the formal (statutory) and informal (de facto) accountability of six economic sector IRAs in Turkey. The mechanisms of accountability of IRAs to the legislature, executive, and judiciary are more firmly established in the legal framework than to non-state actors. Compliance to formal requirements of accountability is high. However, the accountability deficit generated by delegation is not fully eliminated by introducing and effectively implementing a complex network of accountability mechanisms by which the IRAs can be held accountable not only to the three branches of the government, but also to diverse societal actors and to broadly parallel independent institutions.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Political Science and International Relations, Boğazici University, Istanbul
Publication date: September 1, 2009