Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure

Deliberate delegation or abdication? Government backbenchers, ministers and European Union legislation

Buy Article:

$47.50 plus tax (Refund Policy)

This paper analyses how key structural characteristics of the relationship between ministers and government backbenchers influence the extent to which national parliaments of European Union Member States are able to scrutinise and influence EU law-making. Two theoretical perspectives – a ‘parliamentary abdication' and a ‘delegation' perspective – will be used to test contrasting hypotheses. The empirical evidence presented is not unequivocal, but more in line with the ‘delegation' than the ‘abdication perspective': The extent to which national parliaments have institutional opportunities to scrutinise and influence the national government's position in EU affairs can indeed be shown to co-vary (a) with key structural characteristics of the relationship between government backbenchers and ministers and (b) with the electoral saliency of EU affairs in the respective country.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Kent

Publication date: 01 October 2005

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more