SEATO, MEDO, AND THE BAGHDAD PACT: ANTHONY EDEN, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1952–1955

In 1952, in response to a severe balance-of-payments crisis, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden sought to render British foreign policy more affordable. His main recommendation was for the construction of defense organizations for Southeast Asia and the Middle East and, within these organizations, to try to persuade the United States to shoulder the main financial burden of security. In this way British interests (as well as the Cold War defense of both areas) could be bolstered and British commitments reduced without occasioning any diminution of prestige. The emergence of SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955, whilst ostensibly signaling success for Eden's policy, masked two important realities: first, because the US refused to play the role allotted it in the Eden script, neither organization met British criteria for the exercise of “power-by-proxy”; and second, the lesson Eden drew from trying to work with the United States in regional defense from 1952 onwards was that, despite ongoing economic difficulties, Britain might be better off working alone. Hence, by 1955, Eden was less disappointed by the limited US liability in Southeast Asia and the Middle East than might be expected.