@article {Bradley:2017:0269-8595:229,
title = "What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?",
journal = "International Studies in the Philosophy of Science",
parent_itemid = "infobike://routledg/cisp",
publishercode ="routledg",
year = "2017",
volume = "31",
number = "3",
publication date ="2017-07-03T00:00:00",
pages = "229-241",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0269-8595",
eissn = "1469-9281",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cisp/2017/00000031/00000003/art00002",
doi = "doi:10.1080/02698595.2018.1463692",
author = "Bradley, Darren",
abstract = "Peter Br{\"o}ssel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussedit can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic
value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts (like confirmation) can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts (like credences).",
}