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The Borda Count and its real-world alternatives: Comparing scoring rules in Nauru and Slovenia

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This article examines strategic elements of voter behaviour in parliamentary elections where the voting method is a scoring rule other than plurality: the Borda Count, which is used for the election of ethnic minorities in Slovenia, and the Dowdall rule, which is used in the Pacific island state of Nauru in multi-seat districts. After first examining the general properties of scoring rules, and generating theoretical differences between the two rules, we look at empirical evidence from Nauru and Slovenia. This casts a doubt on predictions based simply on a voting rule's mathematical properties and on the accuracy of assumptions of sincere rank ordering.
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Keywords: Borda Count; Nauru; Slovenia; electoral systems; preferential voting systems

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: Victoria University of Wellington, 2: University of California,

Publication date: April 3, 2014

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