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On Repeated Games with Endogenous Matching Decision

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We study infinitely repeated games that are played by many groups simultaneously and where players have the option to maintain or quit relationships. For two-player stage games any individually rational payoff vector in the relative interior of V* can be sustained as equilibrium payoff if the discount factor δ is sufficiently large. Such a statement is not possible for stage games with more than two players. We translate the refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness to our framework and characterize the set of payoffs that can be sustained through strategies that are “bilaterally rational” in the sense of Ghosh and Ray (1996).
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 01 September 2015

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  • Founded as Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

    As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.

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