@article {Heimann:2019:0044-3301:384,
title = "L{\"o}wensteins Begriff von Kompetenz und Regressargumente",
journal = "Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung",
parent_itemid = "infobike://klos/zphf",
publishercode ="klos",
year = "2019",
volume = "73",
number = "3",
publication date ="2019-09-15T00:00:00",
pages = "384-410",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0044-3301",
eissn = "1439-2615",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klos/zphf/2019/00000073/00000003/art00003",
doi = "doi:10.3196/004433019827167627",
author = "Heimann, Fabian",
abstract = "With his recently published account of know-how David L{\"o}wenstein takes a mediating position between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. Therefore it may appear to be an interesting question to what extent arguments from both sides of the debate can be applied to L{\"o}wenstein's
concept. The goal of this paper is to start a discussion of this question with regard to regress arguments which may be seen as variants of Ryle's famous one. As a preparation for this I want to begin with a recapitulation of L{\"o}wenstein's concepts. Afterwards his two main strategies against
the regress argument are discussed. Roughly speaking I will argue that problems arise for both L{\"o}wenstein's deflation hypotheses which are central for the first strategy. In regard to the second strategy I want to show that it also relies on these hypotheses as long as L{\"o}wenstein
does not want to abandon the claim that selfreferential capacities are necessary for genuine competence.",
}