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Sätze und Dinge: Die propositio in re bei Walter Burley und anderen

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This article examines the role of the mediaeval theory of the propositio in re, as proposed by Walter Burley and others, which bears a striking resemblance to the theory of the “proposition” advocated by G. E. Moore and B. Russell. Burley’s proposition composed of real things has the function of an ultimate significate for every sentence of natural language. The main problems of such a theory are on the one hand absurdities like a bird flying between the subject and predicate of a sentence, on the other hand Burley’s assumption that a relation of identity holds between subject and predicate, which might render propositiones in re tautological. Moreover, the particular nature of this relation is left unexplained. But these difficulties can be solved: The former by applying objective being, being as being cognized, to the terms of a propositio, as did Scotus and Franciscus de Prato, the latter by specifying multiple forms of real predication as being or being-in-something apart from a mere identity-relation (e. g. William Milverley).
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2005

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