δέα το γαο – γαν πκεινα τς οσας: Überlegungen zu einer Platonischen Antinomie
In Plato’s Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being (509b9 f.) and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation (the Idea of the Good): by revealing itself, the γαν πκεινα τς οσας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the δα το γαο; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato’s notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called γραφα δγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato’s work.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: January 1, 2005