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Physicalism Shall Never Vanquish'd Be Until â–¦

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Brown and Ladyman (2019) have provided an interesting criterion of refutability of physicalism. The criterion is based on the prediction that physics won't hypothesize the existence of psychological entities. This is an important suggestion because if viable, the criterion could purge physicalism from the charge of being a vacuous doctrine (Crane and Mellor 1990). In this paper, I argue that the criterion of refutability is not viable. I demonstrate that different interpretations of the criterion will prove it either vacuous or incompatible with naturalism.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Universiteler Mahallesi, Dumlupnar Bulvar No:1, 06800 C_ ankaya/Ankara, Turkey; Ankara, Turkey, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2020

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