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Epiphenomenalism and Agency

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A prominent objection against epiphenomenalism -- the doctrine that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious --is that it is incompatible with the phenomenon of human agency. It is essential for our being agents, so the argument goes, that our mental states contribute to the causation of our actions. In this paper, I wish to refute that objection and argue that epiphenomenalism, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, is fully compatible with human agency.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2018

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