Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism
I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain genuine realists about phenomenal experience.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy & Humanities, The University of Texas at Arlington, USA, Email: [email protected]
Publication date: January 1, 2020