Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem
The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the gap between the content of introspection and the content involved in formulations of the hard problem. The inferentialist view of the meta-problem, on which the hard problem results from inference, explains both the psychology and content introduction. We should therefore prefer an inferentialist view of the meta-problem.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Intelligent Robotics Laboratory, Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University, Japan., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: January 1, 2020