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The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness

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The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and -- drawing in part on a similar view developed by Harold Langsam -- discuss how more precisely its answer to the challenge would go.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Hamar, Norway., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2020

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