ISSN 1355-8250 (Print)
Publisher: Imprint Academic
Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness pp. 8-18(11) Author: Kammerer, F.
Bayesing Qualia: Consciousness as Inference, Not Raw Datum pp. 19-33(15) Authors: Clark, A.; Friston, K.; Wilkinson, S.
Undermining Belief in Consciousness pp. 34-47(14) Author: Clarke-Doane, J.
Welcome to Strong Illusionism pp. 48-58(11) Author: Dennett, D.C.
Meta-Hard or Hardly Meta?: Some Possible Confusions Leading to the Hard Problem of Consciousness pp. 59-70(12) Author: Drescher, G.L.
Generating Explanatory Gaps pp. 71-82(12) Authors: Fiala, B.; Nichols, S.
The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness pp. 83-94(12) Author: Frankish, K.
We Are Machines That Claim to Be Conscious pp. 95-104(10) Author: Graziano, M.S.A.
Easy Does It: A Soft Landing for Consciousness pp. 105-114(10) Author: Humphrey, N.
Explaining Variation within the Meta-Problem pp. 115-123(9) Author: Irvine, E.
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach pp. 124-135(12) Author: Kammerer, F.
A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness pp. 136-147(12) Authors: Lau, H.; Michel, M.
On the Meta-Problem pp. 148-159(12) Author: Levine, J.
None of These Problems Are That 'Hard'... or 'Easy': Making Progress on the Problems of Consciousness pp. 160-172(13) Author: Miracchi, L.
Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness' pp. 173-181(9) Author: Papineau, D.
Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of Consciousness pp. 182-193(12) Author: Pereboom, D.
Chalmers' Meta-Problem pp. 194-204(11) Author: Rosenthal, D.
A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness pp. 205-216(12) Author: Saad, B.
From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts pp. 217-227(11) Author: Schwarz, W.
Underestimating the Physical pp. 228-240(13) Author: Strawson, G.
No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread pp. 241-256(16) Authors: Sytsma, J.; Ozdemir, E.
From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know': A Commentary on David Chalmers pp. 257-269(13) Author: Wierzbicka, A.
Idealization and Problem Intuitions: Why No Possible Agent is Indisputably Ideal pp. 270-279(10) Author: Yetter-Chappell, H.
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