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On the Meta-Problem

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According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Unfortunately, I think there are still some serious mysteries lurking here, which I present briefly in this commentary. In particular, on the view of acquaintance I favour, it is unclear how our acquaintance with the contents of experience can serve as data for our theory of conscious experience. I end with some speculations concerning how to address this mystery.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003, USA., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2019

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