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Meta-Hard or Hardly Meta?: Some Possible Confusions Leading to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

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From the materialist stance that I find compelling, the metaproblem of consciousness -- explaining why the problem of consciousness seems hard -- is hardly distinct from the 'easy' problem of explaining how the underlying physical/computational system works, and how it gives rise to perceptions of its own functioning. I discuss several confusions that might plausibly arise in that process, and propose that these confusions could create apparent gaps, ontological and epistemic, in materialist accounts of consciousness, thereby making the hard problem hard. Inversely, resolving these confusions may help solve the hard problem.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2019

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