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A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

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This paper addresses John Searle's criticism of the integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC for short). Among other things, Searle claimed that, since information is a syntactic notion, IITC cannot account for the content of consciousness. He also argued that IITC cannot explain consciousness in causal terms. In this paper, I demonstrate that the original formulation of IITC is compatible with a structuralist reading. After that, I explain how a structuralist reconstruction of IITC could deal with the objections that Searle raised. Among other things, I argue that IITC could provide genuine scientific explanations of consciousness, but the explanations are to be presented in structural, rather than causal, terms.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Amirkabir University of Technology (Philosophy of Science Group, Department of Management, Science and Technology), No. 424, Hafez Street, Tehran, PO Box 3313-15875, Iran., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: January 1, 2018

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