Self-Stultification Objection
Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by physical events while not causing any physical effects whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge
of our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S. Robinson has called into question the soundness of this objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to show that epiphenomenalism
is no less stultifying than its contenders, such as dualism, functionalism, or identity theory. In the current paper I attempt to shift the burden of proof back to Robinson, and thus to defend the self-stultification objection, by offering two counterarguments against one of Robinson's
objections to one of the key premises of the self-stultification objection.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 203A West Duke Building, Box 90743, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0743, USA., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: January 1, 2014
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