Understanding the representational mind. A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper
This paper argues that, from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy, the study of intersubjectivity is closely tied to questions of the representational mind. It focuses on developmental studies of children's understanding of the human mind, setting out some of the main findings and theoretical explanations. It then takes up Husserl's idea of looking at persons in the 'personal attitude'. Understanding motivational connections among a person's subjective experiences is an essential feature of this attitude. Proposing a unified theoretical interpretation of children's representational achievements, the paper suggests that understanding motivational connections among one's representations requires an ability for reflection that children apply in progressively more refined ways to themselves and others.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Laenggasstra. 49A, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland.
Publication date: May 1, 2001