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Beyond reflection in naturalized phenomenology

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In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of naturalized phenomenology into the cognitive sciences is far more feasible than we might have expected.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University at Albany, State University of New York, USA. Email:[email protected]

Publication date: November 1, 2001

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