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Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem

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This paper starts with one of Chalmers’ basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no ‘theoretical fix’ or ‘extra ingredient’ in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenology. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and the correlative field of phenomena established by the cognitive sciences. It needs to expand into a widening research community in which the method is cultivated further.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: LENA (Laboratoire des Neurosciences Cognitives), CNRS URA 654, Hopital de la Salpetriere, 47 Blvd. de l'Hopital, 75651 Paris Cedex 13, FRANCE.

Publication date: April 1, 1996

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