Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure


Buy Article:

$17.79 + tax (Refund Policy)

The theory of justice that Hugo Grotius developed in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace, 1625) set itself against a certain reading of Aristotle, according to which justice is conceived of as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius' mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed this Aristotelian notion in his earlier work. Grotius came to perceive that his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Keywords: Aristotle; De Jure Belli ac Pacis; De Jure Praedae Commentarius; Hugo Grotius; The Law of Prize and Booty; The Law of War and Peace; commutative and distributive justice; doctrine of the; expletive and attributive justice; injustice; justice; meanlove (caritas); perfect and imperfect rights; pleonexia; rights (subjective); virtue and vice

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2015

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more