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Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions

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Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens‐ non‐compliance preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non‐compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.

Keywords: COURT‐CURBING; HIGH COURTS; INCUMBENT GOVERNMENT; NON‐COMPLIANCE; PUBLIC SUPPORT

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: October 1, 2024

This article was made available online on May 8, 2024 as a Fast Track article with title: "Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non-Compliance with High Court Decisions".

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  • Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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